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THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
James K. Irvin
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the chief functions of any legal system is to
provide the machinery for settling disputes between members
of the society which the system serves. No legal system can
be expected to solve all such disputes, but law can create
an atmosphere in which the parties themselves may effect,
without bloodshed, the resolution, minimization or avoidance
of disputes. The disputants may choose an arbiter or conciliator
to reach a settlement for them, or they may bargain and compromise until they find a common basis for an agreement ending
the dispute. The latter process, called negotiation, is the
most effective and by far the most prevalent means of settling
disputes, whether they are between individuals, organizations,
or sovereign states.
International disputes arise when the interests of two
or more states conflict. A dispute may be resolved by the use
of force or it may be settled peacefully by adjudication,
arbitration, conciliation, or negotiation. Regardless of the
means of resolution, some negotiation will occur, and it will
probably influence the ultimate result. Negotiation may be
distinguished from other peaceful means of settlement because
it does not rely on the direct influence of a neutral third
party. Instead, the disputants rely on their bargaining power
and negotiating skill to find a common ground somewhere between
their respective positions.
Because the international legal system has not fully
matured, certain functions are left to independent resolution.
In more advanced and centralized systems these functions would
be performed by legislatures, courts and administrative bodies. 2
The predominant role of negotiation in the settlement of international disputes is, therefore, not very surprising, and, as
the movement toward a centralized international legal order
falls behind the pace of increased international interdependence,
the importance of negotiation grows. 3 Furthermore, because
4
negotiation automatically comes into play when a dispute occurs,
the role of negotiation in contributing to a peaceful settlement is especially significant.
!See text accompanying note 5, infra,which asks whether
adjudication results in the settlement or merely the determination of2 disputes.
H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Tucker
ed. 1966).
3p. JESSUP, THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-34 (1959).
4 DAVIES MEMORIAL
INSTITUTE, REP. OF A STUDY GROUP ON THE
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 31 (1966).

This note will seek answers to three basic questions:
(1) what role does international law play in the negotiation
process; (2) how does that role differ from the role of law
in other settlement processes; and (3) what are the effects
of negotiated dispute settlements on international law? The
examination will focus on the role of law in the process of
negotiation, and in the framework for the settlement of international disputes. Before one attempts to find answers to
these questions, however, some of the important characteristics
of negotiation must be identified.
II. THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION
As mentioned earlier, the principal distinguishing
characteristic of the negotiation process is the absence of
direct influence by third parties. This absence of a neutral
decision-maker leads to settlement by persuasion rather than
by impostion. It can be argued, therefore, that the judicial
and arbitration processes in which the parties are bound by
the judge or arbiter's decision do not actually settle disputes.
Instead, such processes merely resolve disputes by imposing a
decision on the parties which each is liable to question. 5
Does the proposition that settlement by negotiation is
settlement by persuasion imply the absence of a sanction and,
therefore, the absence of the operation of law? Even if the
absence of a sanction is accepted, the answer to this question
is negative. Formal sanctions are not necessary to the operation of an international legal system. While an absence of
sanctions hinders the effective characterization of rules which
ought to be obeyed and lessens the efficiency of the system, it
does not seriously jeopardize the legal order. 6 Consent to
patterns of state behavior has resulted in a framework of
expectancies which operates effectively without formal sanctions.
Also, there exist viable sanctions,even in primitive and decentralized societies such as the world community, and these
sanctions help guide settlement by persuasion. One primitive
sanction is the use of frce in war or reprisal against another
member of the community.
A less primitive example is international opprobrium since no nation wants to stand before the
world as a law-breaker. 8 Such an image creates increased diffibDillard, Some Aspects of Law & Diplomacy, 91 RECUEIL DES
COURS 449, 513-14 (1957). But see Keith, The Role of Law in
the United Nations, 4 VICT. U. WELL. L. REV. 116 (1963-66):
The essence of a law ordered system is substantial voluntary
compliance, not official application and enforcement." See
also Spaeth, Book Review, 11 STAN. L. REV. 586, 588 (1959).
6 W. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 19 (1966).
7 1d. at 19-20;
H. KELSEN, supra note 2, at 20-23.
8 Larson, The Present Status
of Propaganda in International
Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 439 (1966).

culties for the offending state in its relations with all
other states. A settlement by persuasion, therefore, does
not preclude the operation of law since a flexible international law may be at work.
The negotiation process itself is a dynamic one in which
forces representing states' interests play the predominant
role. In international disputes the parties have conflicting
interests which they wish to promote or defend, but they also
possess common interests.9 Conflicting interests form, of course,
the basis of the dispute. For a real dispute to exist and for
diplomatic activity to be more than perfunctory, the interests
in conflict must at least be moderately important to the parties.
A common interest in settling the dispute may, however, outweigh
the parties' conflicting interests. This common interest may be
the parties' desire to avoid military confrontation, economic
disadvantages and other detriments which naturally flow from the
prolongation of the dispute. Another common interest may be the
maintenance of the system, whether it be simply a disputesettlement mechanism, such as a commercial arbitration agreement,
or an economic-poli ical system, such as the Common Market or
the Communist Bloc.
Negotiation involves a polarization and convergence of
the stated positions of the parties. Initial assertions must
be extreme so that necessary concessions later will not prove
overly prejudicial to one's real interests. Settlement can
sometimes be reached by the parties' making mutual concessions
on a single disputed issue. Agreement will usually be reached
at a point approximately mid-way between the initial assertions.
Alternatively, settlement can occur when one party makes a concession on one issue and in exchange obtains concessions on one
or more of the other issues. There are several characteristics
of this concession process which merit attention. Its ease of
application contributes to its effectiveness as a method of dispute settlement. Whether a dispute is eventually settled by
adjudication or arbitration, negotiations can catalyze these
more formal processes toward a determination of the dispute.
Negotiation commences almost automatically at the onset of a
dispute, and it can assume a variety of forms. Any communication in the early stages is usually directed at settlement or at
strengthening and consolidating a party's position with an eye
to future settlements. Communication may occur in private or
at a well-publicized conference; and it may be effected by conversation, diplomatic votes, public statements, press releases
or calculated rumors. No formal procedure is required, but it
is generally utilized as is in other settlement processes.
9See F. IKLE, HOW NATIONS NEGOTIATE 2 (1964).
The Cold War and the Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes: A Comment, 6 DUQUESNE L. REV. 117, 119 (1968).
1 0 Cohen,

Another important attribute of negotiation is therefore
its flexibility. Although ceremony is unnecessary, it can
be added to provide gravity or pomp as the case requires,
while more effective talks are conducted behind the scenes.
This seems to be the format of the current Paris Peace
Conference on Vietnam.
Negotiation, more than other settlement processes, is
likely to bring the parties to a position of bargaining at
arms' length. The adversarial attitude required when before
a court or arbitral tribunal seems unnecessary. When circumstances permit, candid exchanges may lead to a quick and uncomplicated settlement.
One of the characteristics which limits the effectiveness of negotiation is the slowness and indefiniteness of
its decision-making process. There is no guarantee that a
decision will ever be reached. This possibility sends disputing states to a concilator, arbitrator, or adjudicator.
Ideally, these decision-makers will make an objective determination of fact or law upon which further settlement efforts may
be predicated.
Other limiting characteristics of negotiation include
the following:
(1) The parties confront each other with only
their own legal and factual assertions and whatever evidence
they choose to offer;
(2) The inclination to use the conference
table as means of presenting one's case to the world reduces
the efficiency of negotiation;
(3) Governments are often reluctant to initiate concessionary moves because of domestic
pressures;
(4) Negotiation entails a greater risk of the
exercise of undue pressure by a state capable of such exercise
than do more formalized procedures. Courts can, to some
extent, police the parties, and both courts and arbitrators can
refuse to consider the presence of undue pressures while seeking
to make an objective determination;
(5) The success of nego-tiation depends upon the parties' genuine desire for settlement.
Settlement is impossible when one of the parties
persists in
11
retaining manifestly unreasonable demands.
Some observations on the characteristics of the crucial
individuals involved in negotiated settlements seem relevant
to a discussion of the role of law in negotiation. Negotiators enjoy a multiplicity of roles as participants in the
diplomatic process. First, they are advocates representing
a party to whom undivided loyalty is owed. Partisanship
IIDAVIES INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 33; Dillard, supra
note 5, at 513-514. "The chief weakness of law is that it is
'imposed' upon the parties while the chief virtue of diplomacy
is that it is not, . . . conversely, the chief virtue of law

that it eliminates the need for 'good faith' and the chief
weakness of diplomacy is that it is based on it."

is paramount. 1 2 Second, the negotiator is a legislator who,
through agreement with the other parties, enacts rules of
procedure and creates the substantive rights and duties
embodied in settlement agreements. Finally, the negotiator
is an adjudicator. Acting together, two or more negotiators
effect a balancing of interests upon which is based a
decision acceptable to all.
It should be remembered that negotiators are human
beings and members of a particular society. As the
representative of a state, and as the product of that state's
cultural and political systems, the negotiator has developed
different values from those of his adversaries. He will
obviously attempt to predicate settlements consistent with
these values. 1 3 The negotiator's background will also
influence his means of thinking and communicating, which,
in varying degrees, will be different from those of his
adversaries. Language
and semantics present problems which
14
cannot be avoided.
The negotiator's domestic political hierarchy exerts
immediate personal pressure on him, since what he says and
accomplishes, strengthens or threatens his position in his
government. This internal pressure often makes the necessary
concessions of negotiation difficult and sometimes impossible,
since most concessions involve a retreat from a publiclystated position.
A final characteristic of the men who conduct negotiations is especially relevant to the subject of this note.
Many of them are lawyers or persons who have had legal
training. 1 5 Moreover, in almost every case, diplomats are
thoroughly briefed by legaladvisers as to the legal implications of their assertions and objectives. In many disputes,
and especially in those which raise legal questions
diplomats will regard the recommendations of their legal
adviser's office as controlling. In all negotiations, the
1 2 It

has been argued that the negotiator's primary
function is to act as an interpreter between his government
and the adversary. Occasionally efforts to analyze and
understand the adversary's arguments have weakened the
negotiator's convictions concerning the need for him to
firmly advocate his own country's arguments. The Russians
are said to avoid this problem by permitting their
negotiators to do little more than express the centralized
decision-makers' positions. Mosely, Some Soviet Techniques
of Negotiation, in NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS 271
(R. Dennet & J. Johnson eds. 1951).
1 3 M. MCDOUGAL,
STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 12-13
(1960). The same is, of course, true of all participants
in an dispute settlement process.
y 4 See generally A. OSTROWER, LANGUAGE, LAW AND
DIPLOMCY (1965) (2 vol.).
1P. CORBETT, LAW IN DIPLOMACY 41-42 (1959); M. MCDOUGAL,
supra note 13.

16
legal adviser's influence is substantial.
The foregoing constitutes a summary description of the
negotiation process. Before examining the role of law in
negotiation, it would be appropriate to consider briefly
what is meant by "law" in this context. One definition
declares that law is a prophecy of the action of the agents
of society.1 7 For our purposes, the relevant "society" is
the primitive society of nations, whose agents are the
nations themselves. Positivists base their prophecies on
what nations have done in the past. From past acts inferences
may be drawn describing which kinds of state behavior will
be consented to by other states. Evidence of this predicted
consent may be found in international conventions, customs,
judicial decisions, and the writing of publicists. Collectively, these sources may be found in such abundance that 1 8
they have achieved the status of general principles of law.
Is there a difference between the international law
applied by courts and the international law applicable in
the negotiation process? The likelihood of a consensus of
states agreeing on the relevance of an applicable rule of
law will be greater for a localized group of states-parties,
most of whom consent to the same kinds of behavior, than
if the parties represent groups of nations which are
geographically, economically, and culturally different.
The existence of these localized legal norms in addition to
norms generally recognized by all states, provides a source
of applicable rules and increases the probability that
law will play a significant role in a given dispute settlement. 1 9 For instance, Belgium and France entertain similar
views of traditional international law as developed by
Europe, England and the United States over the past three
centuries. Some of the norms represented by this body of
law and accepted by western countries are rejected by much
of the rest of the world. Such a rule is the requirement
of compensation for expropriation. This rule may be
available in a dispute between Belgium and France but
unavailable in a dispute between France and an underdeveloped
country, whose plans for industrial or agricultural reorganization would be hampered by a requirement of compensation

i6Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State
Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L.
(1962).
633, 654-55
17 p. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 4 (1950).
1 8 See I.C.J.
STAT. art. 38.
19The increased availability of applicable rules of
law also encourages the settlement of disputes by adjudication. See Katz, The Cold War and the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes: The Relevance of International
Adjudication, 6 DUQUESNE L. REV. 95, 110 -1968).-

for expropriation. 2 0 If negotiations prove unsuccessful
in a dispute involving the expropriation without compensation
of French citizens' property by the government of the underdeveloped country, has the rule of law failed to regulate
the relations of the parties?
Even negotiating countries operating in the same local
international legal system must reach agreement in order to
successfully assert the validity of a rule of law, since
the party who must be persuaded to accept the rule is an
interested adversary rather than a disinterested arbiter
or judge. Consequently, several theories of law may be
at work in negotations: one based on the consent of all
nations and supported by many of the traditional sources of
law; and one based on the consent of more localized communities of nations, often limited to the negotiating states
themselves. The second is different from that which might
be applied by an international tribunal, but it can be
effectively utilized in negotiation. In this note, "law"
*ill refer to consensual norms operating at both worldwide and local levels, but the respective distinctions of
each should be kept in mind.
III.

THE ROLE OF LAW IN NEGOTIATION PROCEDURE

Negotiation is a procedure which international law
encourages by prohibiting the use of force to settle
disputes. 2 1 The United Nations seeks to insure that all
international disputes will be settled by peaceful means.
Toward this end, it requires states to seek solutions by
a number2 f different means, the first of which is negoWhere negotiation is directed by law, law is
tiation.
present, though most negotiations would occur with or without the Charter's direction. Nevertheless legal recognition
and encouragement of negotiation stimulates the use of law
in the negotiation process itself.
That something called the negotiation procedure exists implies that the process is an ordered one in which participating states conduct themselves in a reasonably predictable
manner. There may be, therefore, an international law of
negotiation procedure. A portion of this law includes what 2 3
have been collectively referred to as rules of accommodation.
These rules generally operate only when all nations, party
to the negotiation, are basically friendly and genuinely
interested in reaching a settlement. Rules of accommodation
2 UThis

was one of the problems in the negotiations
between the United States and Mexico in 1927 arising out
of Mexican expropriation of land formerly owned by United
States citizens. See 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 655-61
2 1 U. N.(1942).
CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
2 2 1d. art. 33, para. 1.
2 3 F-IKLA,
HOW NATIONS NEGOTIATE, ch. 7 (1964).

are those whose violation would almost invariably terminate
the negotiations and threaten the relations between the
violator and the other state-parties. Examples of such
rules are the generally accepted proscription of the threat
or the use of force against other negotiators, and the
prohibition of flagrant lies. 2 4 Some, such as the proscription of force, are observed by nearly all countries, and
these form the basis for positive legal doctrines like
diplomatic immunity. Others, such as the prohibition of
flagrant lying, are regularly followed only by members
of the Atlantic Community or other localized nation groups. 2 5
Negotiators may adhere to rules of accommodation for the
sake of expediency or propriety, but the basic reason for
such adherence is the hope that it will induce the adversary's
adherence, thereby making his behavior more predictable.
Because of their consensual nature and the results they
seek to bring about, rules of accommodations operate much
like rules of international law. Their operation in the
negotiation process can therefore be considered to be an
example of the operation of law. Rules of accommodation
guide international negotiations through consensual procedures
which ease tensions by making behavior predictable. These
procedures accelerate the possibility of early agreement by
increasing the efficiency of the negotiations. International
law, as represented by these rules therefore, plays an
important role in the negotiation process.
IV.

LAW AS A NEGOTIATING TOOL

If there exists a means by which a negotiator can
strengthen or appear to strengthen his position, he will
find that means and use it. Law is a negotiating tool
which can be effectively utilized by negotiators as a
procedural device and as a support for substantive arguments. 2 6
Law can be used in the procedural context of negotiation
much the same way as rules of procedure are used by lawyers
in domestic court trials. For example, issues to be tried
are defined by various pleadings; definition of issues to
24

1d. at 92.
25Id. at 91. See also C. JOY, HOW COMMUNISTS NEGOTIATE
(1955). for a frustrated American negotiator's view of the
North2 Koreans'
disregard of rules of accommodation at Panmunjon.
6 F. IKL,
supra note 23, at 90. The author would
reverse the emphasis set forth in the text. "[Wihile those
who observe rules of accommodation would obviously prefer
the opponent to reciprocate, this is not always felt to
be mandatory. Some rules are expected to produce beneficial
results even if the opponent ignores them; others require
reciprocation only in the long run..

.

. At any rate, to

some negotiators the efficacy of the rules seems secondary
because they follow them as the conventionally correct
behavior, in keeping with proprieties."

be resolved in international negotiation is accomplished by means of an ageida. Use of and adherence to an 7
agenda has become a settled principle of international law.2
Participants in negotiations use the agenda both to include
certain topics as proper subjects to negotiation and to avoid
discussion of other topics.
The application of international law, to support one's
arguments and to justify one's actions is a significant
characteristic of negotiation. Parties can generally be
expected to maintain that their positions are consistent
with international law, because no nation wishes to stand
before the international community as an admitted law-breaker. 2 8
Whether or not, therefore, the conduct which initiated the
dispute was purely expedient, justification under international
law will be attempted. If the disputed conduct was purely
expedient, either fact or law may have to be distorted.
For instance, Russia distorted facts when she asserted that
the Czechoslovakian government had invited intervention
under the Warsaw Pact in the summer of 1968. Peru has broadly
interpreted the law of the sea as giving her territorial sea
rights well beyond the maximum limits established by a consensus of nations. Each case involves the distortion of
either fact or law in order to justify state action under
international law.
Negotiating states assert that their positions are in
accord with international law for a number of reasons. One
is to express moral justification for the maintenance of a
particular position. The opposing negotiator will probably
be too sophisticated to make concessions on the basis of the
other side's moral arguments. What is hoped-for is the persuasion of those not privy to the negotiations, viz. the world
community, of the justness of one's position. If this proves
successful, it may bring indirect pressure on the opposing
negotiator or his country.
Law can also be used in negotiation to express firmness.
An effective demonstration that one's position complies with
international law and that the opponent's position does not,
implies that concessions would amount to submission to the
opponent's illegal conduct. The negotiator, therefore,
attempts to create an impression that his position is firmly
grounded on legal principles. 2 9 If such an impression is
successfully created, a slight concession from the position
sought to be justified may be regarded by the opponent as
a substantial concession.
Finally, the assertion that one's position is in accord
with principles of international law may express an intent or
desire to negotiate within a framework of law. Such assertions
will invite counter-arguments based on law and perhaps they
will invite a settlement based on law.
2 7 1d.

at 98.
28Se Larson, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
2 9 F---IKLE, supra note 9, at 201, 202.

These are some ot the effects hoped for by those who
employ legal arguments in negotiation. Another result may
or may not occur: the settlement of the dispute may be based
on law. Legal arguments will be meaningful and a settlement
based on law will result only when negotiation takes place
in an atmosphere which is conducive to legal argument and
where the arguments are bona fide. Ostensibly sound legal
arguments are meaningless when either a fact or a proposed
principle of law is stretched beyond reasonable interpretation
in order to accommodate an extreme negotiating position.
For example, in a bilateral dispute the parties may
find themselves in direct conflict on one issue. One side's
position may be supported by propositions of law which truly
reflect an international norm. The other side's position may
have to be distorted to fit a rule derived from international
norms, or the party may attempt to distort the rule to fit
the facts. President Theodore Roosevelt's justification for
the United States' intervention in Panama in 1903, as action
representing "a mandat from civilization," is an example
Russia's justification for the
of the former tactic.
Hungarian and Czechoslovakian invasions as being in response
to requests from the respective governments of those countries,
exemplifies the latter. When law is used in this manner by
a party to a negotiated dispute settlement, that settlement
is not based on law. Negotiated settlements are reached by
process of mutual compromise in which the parties find a
basis for agreement somewhere between their extreme positions.
When one party's initial position can be supported by general
principles of international law but the other party must
distort the law to support his position, the established
rule of law will be necessarily compromised. If the compromise
is substantial, law will have been effectively rejected as
a basis for the settlement. If the compromise is slight,
law will probably have strengthened the position of the
party using it for support, and the settlement will, therefore,
have been indirectly based on law.
The rejection of law described above need not occur
if both sides' legal arguments represent reasonable interpretations of international legal principles. Compromise
will result in the mutual acceptance of interpretations which
reasonably conform to consensual.international law, and the
settlement of the dispute maybe based on those interpretations.
Between 1927 and 1938, the United States and Mexico conducted
negotiations by exchanging notes on the expropriations of
United States citizens' property in Mexico. 3 1 While both
sides acknowledged that the expropriations were lawful, the
United States argued, and Mexico denied, that such expropriations must be accompanied by "adequate.2 effective, and
prompA. payment for the properties seized."
Mexico expressed a
-up.

CORBETT, LAW IN DIPLOMACY 55-56 (1959).

3 1 See,

3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
655-661 (1942).
3 2 Note from Secretary
of State Hill to the Mexican
Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 22, 1938, in 3 G.
HACKWORTH, supra note 31, at 658.

willingness to make some payment but contended that no rule
of international law required her to do so. The rule propounded by Mexico appeared inappropriate to the United States
because her citizens believed that property taken for public
use had to be paid for in full. The rule asserted by the
United States was inappropriate from Mexico's point of view,
because Mexico had expropriated the property as part of a
general plan of agrarian reform. Eventually, the parties
agreed to form a commission which would determine the
appropriate compensation for the seized property. The compromise resulted in recognition by Mexico that some compensation
was necessary, and the United States recognized that such
compensation could be less than adequate, effective, and
prompt. Neither concession was expressed in the correspondence.
The settlement was based on an unexpressed proposition lying
somewhere between the positions stated by the parties. In
this case, the parties effectively used law as a negotiating
tool and found a workable rule of law through the bargainand-compromise process of negotiation.
It should be noted that adjudicated settlements also
avoid the probleni created by distorted legal arguments.
Although a judge will balance the conflicting interests of
the disputing parties in reaching his decision, he can impose
a settlement without having to accommodate a distorted legal
proposition offered to support a party's position. The
resulting settlement will also be consistent with what a
consensus of the members of the community regard as "law."
Unfortunately, international law is particularly
amenable to distortion by negotiators seeking to justify their
actions. Rules of international law are derived from
many sources, none of which is entirely authoritative.
Furthermore, within each general source, such as court decisions and writings of publicists, many varying interpretations
may be found. Finally, those settled rules which have been
generally accepted by many states are few in number. These
few are stated in broad terms subject to variant interpretations,
especially when states attempt to apply them to new and
increasingly complicated fact situations.
V.

LAW AS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE

When the parties to a dispute expressly or tacitly
acknowledge that relevant rules of law exist, that such rules
are applicable, and that they should be used as a reference
for determining the rights and duties of the parties, then
the dispute may be settled within a framework of law. This
is the ultimate role that law can play in negotiations.
Rarely does law play a significant role in negotiated dispute
settlement since factors which militate against an increased
role of law in negotiations are generally present, and factors
which encourage settlementwithin a framework of law are
generally absent.

One factor which discourages the influence of law in
negotiation is that the parties rarely possess equal strength
or bargaining power. When one of the parties is stronger
and has the opportunity to use his military or economic power,
to influence the negotiations, he will be disinclined to
forego the benefits of that advantage and to agree to a
settlement based strictly on law. In almost every case,
one party to the negotiation will enjoy some advantage in power
over his adversary.
A related factor is that nations of different social
and economic backgrounds will entertain different views
of international law. The Mexican-American dispute, concerning the expropriations arising out of Mexico's agrarian
reform, is a case in point. Mexico needed to reallocate
land which had previously been held under the laws of a
colonial and feudal system. Since immediate and full
compensation to prior landowners was impossible, Mexico,
like other emerging nations, was naturally inclined to
view the international law of expropriation as requiring
something less than full and immediate compensation. The
United States, on the other hand, was a prosperous country
with deeply rooted traditions demanding respect for private
property. She was, therefore, incined to embrace a rule
which supported full compensation. The dispute was finally
settled by compromising legal arguments, but no generally
accepted rule of law was found to which both parties would
submit.
Negotiations proved completely unsuccessful because of this failure to discover a justifiable legal compromise
when Cuba nationalized the property of United States citizens
in 1960.
A third factor which militates against the negotiated
settlement of disputes within a framework of law is that
states are still reluctant to rely on law in the face of
a threat to their security or other vital interests.
Survival is more important than the maintenance of the system. Thus, as elements in the dispute threaten vital interests, the parties will be less inclined to submit to a determination of issues according to law. Instead, they will
employ more concrete bargaining tools, such as threats of
countermeasures or retaliation.
The factors which militate toward negotiated settlements
within a framework of law are generally not present; these
are the same factors which would militate toward dispute
settlement by other means within a framework of law. 34
One such factor is the availability of a set of applicable
legal rules. As has been demonstrated above, those predictions
JJNor has a generally accepted rule regarding
compensation for expropriation yet been found. See I. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 352 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). Rarely
is any compensation paid for national expropriations, though
it is 3 often
promised. E. MOONEY, FOREIGN SEIZURES 4 (1967).
4 See Katz,
supra note 17, at 110-111.

of national behavior to which the world community as a
whole consents are generally very broad and few in number.
Were there a sophisticated and large body of applicable
rules of law, decisions based on such law, whether made
by adjudicators or negotiators, would be easier and
distortion of legal arguments would be more difficult.
This requires the sophistication and development of other
forms of peaceful dispute settlement. Applicable principles
of law, to be effectively used by negotiators to settle
disputes within a framework of law, must emanate from
established sources through established procedure. 3 5
Another factor which should help effectuate a settlement within a framework of law is a high degree of legal
development within the states which are party to the
negotiations. Men who are used to solving domestic problems
in the context of an effective domestic legal system will
be more likely to seek solutions to international disputes
within a framework of law, than will their counterparts
from countries with ineffective legal systems.
If all of the factors which favor the negotiated
settlement of an international dispute within a framework
of law are present, and all the factors which militate against
a settlement based on law are absent, such a settlement
nevertheless may not occur. Negotiation is a simple and
practical method of conflict resolution. The parties deal
at arms' length and are in a position from which they can
easily trade concessions to achieve mutually desirable results, despite the availability of applicable rules of law
which might suggest other arrangements. Law may be used
as a tool by a party whose position it supports, but, in
that case, law may only have the effect of adding weight to
concession from that position. If all the factors which
favor the facile and effective operation of the negotiation
process are present, the parties will proceed expeditiously
to a settlement, with or without the aid of legal rules.
VI.

THE IMPACT OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS ON LAW

A principal source of international law is the custom
and usage of nations, 3 6which is derived from patterns of
state behavior. The settlement process of international
disputes represents state behavior. It also indicates that
certain forms of state behavior have in certain circumstances
been consented to by other states. Analysis of the arguments
pressed by negotiators and of the bases for agreement which
they find, may, therefore, be a useful source of law. Additionally, such analyses may reveal changes in the law.
Negotiated settlements may be subjected to quantitative
analysis, and such an analysis of similar agreements in
negotiations on similar subjects may reveal international
35Id.
36 p. COBBETT, CASES AND OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
5-6 (3d ed. 1909).

usage or an international consensus as to permissible patterns
of behavior. For example, an analysis of negotiations
arising out of national expropriations, such as the negotiations between the United States and Mexico, might reveal
a consensus as to the quantum of compensation forthcoming
after the seizure of aliens' property. The result might be
that no compensation is required. Despite the strenuous
maintenance of legal arguments supporting compensation and
promises by expropriating states that compensation is forthcoming, former property-owners are rarely paid. 3 7
Quantitative analysis can also be made of the number
of states (and their interests) involved in a single negotiation or series of negotiations in which participation is
widespread. Often the process of analysis is facilitated by
the integration of consensus positions into a convention,
such as the Conventions on the Law of the Sea 3 8 or a resution, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
These documents have a greater significance than mere evidence
of contractual relations between signatory states. They
can be regarded as evidence of general principles of law,
depending on the number of signatories, the substance of
the agreement, and other factors.
Negotiated dispute settlements may be found to have
an impact on law when they are subjected to an analysis
of a qualitative nature. Examination of the duration and
difficulty of the settlement process may reveal the availability or absence of rules or precedents. Analysis of
the arguments used, their effectiveness, which positions
are successfully maintained, and which are compromised
may indicate which propositions of law can weather contentious
proceedings. Finally, if the settlement is effective and
if the parties find a way to eliminate or to live with
the circumstances which caused the dispute, a workable rule
of suggested conduct may emerge possessing general
applicability to other similar circumstances which threaten
to precipitate disputes.
By such inquires, one may discern the limited and
subtle influences that negotiated settlements have on law.
The law is influenced, but such influences differ from
those of other forms of dispute settlement. This is true,
principally because negotiation lacks a common characteristic of these other methods - the impartial third party
decision-maker. Conciliation is much like negotiation.
The conciliator's decision is not necessarily bindfng, but
it will probably represent a compromise position and the
J/See E. MOONEY, supra note 33.
April 29, 1958, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF. 13/L.
52-55, reprinted in 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1958).
39G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR, Res I, at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 127
(Supp. 1949).
3 8 Signed

parties will likely agree to follow it. The disputants
do not ask the conciliator to decide which rule of law
applies. They seek only a fair decision as a basis for
the settlement of their dispute. An arbitrator also seeks
a solution to the dispute before him, but he has much more
latitude in referring to law to determine how the dispute
ought to be settled. An adjudicator should attempt to
ground his decision in generally accepted principles of
law. In the international context, a judge's interest in
the continuing efficacy of his court and in the rendering
of a decision with which both parties can abide may lead
him to reach a decision that is apparently a compromise of
interests. Again, however, the decision must be grounded
in recognized principles of law.4 0 As the authority
of the third party decision-maker increases, there is therefore, greater likelihood that his decision will reflect
more than a compromise of competing interests. There is,
in fact, a greater likelihood that his decision will reflect
international community attitudes concerning the manner in
which disputes like the one at hand ought to be decided.
There is also a greater likelihood that such a third party
decision-maker will look to international law as evidence
of those community attitudes and ideas.
In a negotiated settlement there is much less likelihood that the "decision" agreed upon by the parties will
be based on international law or justified under it.
Other than providing evidence of national behavior, decisions
reached by negotiation are therefore, not as precise
indicants of international law as the decisions of arbitrators
or judges. In some cases negotiated settlements may even
be misleading, as where a party whose position accords
with law compromises his position to obtain concession on
another issue.
On the other hand, a significant number of negotiated
dispute settlements, when properly analyzed, can provide
evidence of what the law is and how the law may have changed.
This is especially true when the analysis reveals that law
played an important role, either as a negotiating tool or
as a framework for the settlement of the dispute.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing it may be concluded that there is
some operation of law in most negotiated dispute settlements.
The extent of the role of law as a procedural guide, as a
negotiating tool, or as a framework for the entire negotiation
and settlement, depends upon a variety of factors. These
will vary in every negotiation and are capable of change
during the course of each single negotiation. The role of
law and the impact of settlement on the law are less
apparent in negotiation, than they are in other forms of
40See, e.g., I.C.J. STAT. art. 38.

dispute settlement.
Should negotiation, for this reason, be discouraged
in favor of more sophisticated means of dispute settlement,
which may contribute more to the development of law? This
might be desirable were the rule of law the ultimate
goal of world organization. Whatever that ultimate goal
may be, it must embrace a system of orderly and peaceful
means for settling the disputes which naturally arise from
increased international intercourse. Negotiation is a
simple, efficient, and flexible means of dispute settlement, and, therefore, furthers this policy whether or not
law plays a substantial role. As world order based upon
law continues to develop and law increasingly pervades
other forms of international interaction, law should
increase its role in negotiated dispute settlements.

